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INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1927 the eminent American jurist and future
Supreme Court justice Professor Felix Frankfurter said in his
monograph on “Mr Justice Holmes and the Constitution”:
“The eternal struggle in the law between constancy and
change is largely a struggle between history and reason,
between past reason and present needs.”
The title for this lecture was suggested at least partly by the
realisation that this struggle – which I shall describe in
more conventional terms as a struggle between
“continuity” and change – is one that I recognise as a
recurrent theme throughout my working life. Though, I
suspect it may have been a struggle for the Parliamentary
Counsel since their inception in 1869.
What I seek to do in this lecture is to illuminate current
UK drafting practice in the light of that struggle over the
past 35 years. The tension I wish to address, however, is
different from the one that is of such importance to an
American constitutional jurist considering the tension
between constancy in the law by adherence to the wording
and the decided cases on the meaning of the Constitution
and the “change” that results from adapting it to ﬁt
modern conditions.
On the other hand, the potential for a comparable
developing tension in the principles of UK statutory
interpretation in the context of the Human Rights Act
1998, and the increasing importance of a developing
doctrine of the separation of powers, is something I shall
brieﬂy touch on, and one of the reasons I thought it apt to
start with the US quotation.
For a legislative drafter, the contrast between anything at all
and change is one that has to be discussed in a context in
which it is change itself that is the constant. The paradox
of Heraclitus of Ephesus, “there is nothing permanent
except change” certainly applies to the legislative drafter.
The principal — and arguably the only — function of the
drafter is to change the law. One of the guiding doctrines
of UK Parliamentary Counsel has always been that
unnecessary material in statutes tends to turn septic. UK
drafters have traditionally sought to avoid the inclusion of
anything in legislation that goes beyond a legal change, or
which distracts from the change that is required.
On that basis, the struggle for the drafter is to reconcile the
demands of continuity with an imperative for change. The
complication is that, as I see it, demands for continuity
have been operating within a context which is itself
constantly changing: partly as a result of other legislation,
but also as a result of outside factors, legal, social, political,
environmental and so on.
My question is what sort of change, or at least adaptation,
do the legal, social and other changes going on in the
context require to the way legal change itself is effected and
expressed, by drafting? How are those requirements
reconciled with often equally compelling demands for
continuity? Are there respects in which remaining constant
to a traditional method might itself deny the effectiveness
of a change legislation seeks to produce?
CONTINUITY
It is in some respects a primary function of law to preserve
continuity. The author of my opening quotation, Mr Justice
Felix Frankfurter, during his subsequent judicial career,
addressed in Helvering v Halloch 309 US 119 (1940) the
tension between constancy and change in the
interpretation of the US constitution in these words:
“We recognise that stare decisis represents an important
element of social policy. It represents an element of continuity
in law and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy
reasonable expectations.”
An important element of the case for continuity in the way
legislation is drafted is the need for the form of law to
satisfy reasonable expectations. Many eminent jurists,
including Lord Bingham in the Sixth Sir David Williams
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lecture on “The Rule of Law” have emphasised the
importance of continuity and predictability as a
component of the rule of law. An element of predictability
and permanence is an essential contributor to the role of
law in preserving social cohesion and doing justice.
The same applies, I suggest, to how it is expressed. An
understanding of the principled bias of the law in favour of
continuity is essential to the drafter of legislation, who is
better being predictable than indulging a talent for
surprise. As Ben Johnson said in Timber or Discoveries made
upon Men and Matter (published posthumously in 1640): “A
man coynes not a new word without some peril and lesse
fruit, for if it happen to be received, the praise is but
moderate; and if refused, the scorne is assured.”
But I suggest that the demands of continuity are not
constant. For at least 35 years the relationship between
what the transatlantic lawyer would call the three branches
of government has been changing. The dynamism in the
relationship has been attributable in part to some major
legislative and constitutional changes, but it has also been
inﬂuenced by other factors. It is that dynamism in the
relationship that sets the context for legislative drafting
that has proved both a challenge and a fascination to those
of us who have had to work within it. Not only has the
drafter often been aiming at a moving target. The drafter
has also often been aiming from a moving platform. What
I want to discuss is how much our practices have changed
to match the changing context.
In my chapter for the book Drafting Legislation – a Modern
Approach (The collection of essays in memory of Sir
William Dale, which I understand is to be launched after
this lecture), I explain how the role of the drafter is that of
“drawing the line” and about how that contrasts with the
work of the ordinary practising lawyer whose job is to “ﬁnd
the line”. I explain how, in drawing the line, the drafter has
to make a whole series of balancing judgments that set the
parameters for what amounts to good drafting. That
chapter is about the freedom of the individual drafter when
confronted with a blank piece of paper, but it is also about
the constraints that affect how the individual drafter
resolves various tensions in the case of an individual piece
of work.
In discussing continuity and change in drafting practice,
and thus in the collective approach to drafting within our
jurisdiction, I am today dealing with a further factor acting
as a constraint on the drafter. That extra factor is the need
to be consistent with what has to be a collective
understanding of the developing and changing relationship
between the courts on the one hand and Parliament and
the executive on the other. That context sets the syntax for
drafting and, collectively, drafters need to adapt to the
changing syntax, while remaining conscious that the
adaptation can itself either effect or inhibit further change,
and that they need to assess that and be cautious about it.
The extent to which a collective approach is needed is of
particular interest to me in my current capacity as the
leader of an ofﬁce of legislative drafters. The head of every
drafting ofﬁce has to make judgments on what is
appropriate where there are competing claims for
consistency and innovation.
So, what — for drafters of legislation collectively — is the
importance of continuity?
The essential prerequisite for being able to draft effective
legislation is to be able accurately to predict how it will be
applied in practice. That means working with the grain of
the interpretative principles currently applied by the courts
and it involves safeguarding principles and practices that
maintain order and consistency in the whole process.
The demands of continuity require a balance to be struck
about how new propositions are approached. This involves
looking at the demands of continuity by looking both
forwards and backwards. Looking forwards, it is
important for what is drafted to be understood both
immediately and in the longer term. This applies not only
to the Bill, and the resulting Act, but also to future Bills and
Acts to be drafted either by the drafter or by his or her
colleagues.
Immediate comprehensibility in Parliament is essential if
the Bill is to pass. Immediate effectiveness on
commencement is also essential to deliver the
implementation of the government policy to which an Act
is to give effect. Those factors draw the drafter into the
speciﬁc and the contemporary. They present an incentive
to accede to requests for immediate clariﬁcation or
exposition in the legislation.
However, the drafter must also look further into the future.
There are risks in concentrating solely on the immediate
implementation of the Act. The potential lifetime of statute
law imposes an imperative for continuity in the style and
general approach to drafting. Much statute law may appear
to the practitioner to be a transitory thing renewed and
altered with regularity. But statute law needs to be drafted
in the knowledge that it must make sense not only today,
but also next year or in 10 or even, like the US
Constitution, in over 200 years time.
Here is a factor that draws the drafter into the abstract and
a use of language that is conservative enough to stand a
chance of passing for timeless. Of course Alexander Pope’s
advice (in An essay in criticism, (1711), at p 333), also plays
a part.
In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;
Alike fantastic, if too new, or old:
Be not the first by whom the new are tryed,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
Looking forward in a strategic way, the drafter must not
debase the coinage of communication for the future. Every
Bill (even if it is not making major constitutional or legal
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change) is potentially contributing to expectations about
the form and content of future legislation. A clariﬁcation
that short-term considerations might make desirable can
be undesirable if it will create an implication that the
matter will always be clariﬁed in future. The expression of
an idea in a novel way may create an assumption that the
idea will continue to be expressed in that way. Drafters
need to remember that divergent practices, when
examined close up, can be analysed chronologically and
made to look like a collective change of direction.
On the other hand, this analysis prompts me to wonder
whether one thing drafters have to recognise is the extent
to which a period of very signiﬁcant change in the context
in which legislation is interpreted itself creates a tendency
to greater volume. In such a period, the long-term
statutory outcomes are likely to be less predictable because
they depend on the direction of future change. If, as a
result, the balance, for both the drafter and others involved
in the framing of legislation, between achieving short-term
effectiveness and securing long term stability shifts in
favour of the the short term, what effect will that have on
the character of the legislative product? And how should
the drafter manage that potential effect?
Continuity is also reinforced when the drafter looks
backwards. At that point, similar considerations apply as
when looking forwards, although sometimes the backwards
look leads to different conclusions.
First, looking backwards at the immediate past, it is
important that the new law ﬁts with the old. The common
characteristic of every legislative provision is that it is
changing law, not just making new law. Has the connection
with the previous law and the transition from it been
adequately provided for? Just as there must be no holes in
the new law, so there must be no holes in the old law where
the join is made with the new. This is one area where
continuity must clearly be an element of change. I discuss
in my Chapter for Drafting Legislation – a Modern Approach
how the drafter may have to decide whether to put the
emphasis in a draft on the destination of the proposed legal
change or on the route to that destination. But continuity
demands that there should always be a route.
Secondly, looking backwards, the drafter must ensure that
the drafting approach does not prejudice the interpretation
of provisions that have already been drafted. Here is a real
tension between continuity and change. Just as an
innovation in drafting may commit future drafters to a
particular approach for the future, it can also condemn
them for not having adopted a particular approach in the
past. A change of approach may be wholly justiﬁed by new
circumstances, but it may still carry a risk of creating a
misleading impression about the drafting of past Acts.
This can be complicated if the common law background is
itself developing to undermine the premise on which
previous legislation was written. (An example would be the
development of a remedy for the recovery of money paid
under a mistake of law – see Beatson, J, (2006) “Common
law, statute law and constitutional law” 27 SLR 1). Must
the drafter accept and ratify a development and so,
perhaps, accelerate the mismatch with previous legislation
— particularly if a retrospective cure for the earlier
legislation is likely to be impossible? Or should the drafter
risk being left behind by a development that has begun but
the future shape of which remains unclear?
Drafters worry about the risk of unintended consequences
outside their range of vision. It is understanding this area
of uncertainty that gives importance to continuity and
imbues the drafter with caution about the risk of
inadvertently demolishing a load-bearing wall
So, the claims of continuity are great. They lead to the
principle that legislation must be drafted in the way in
which the courts expect to be communicated with. There
must be a sound analysis of principles and ideas, and the
legislation must conﬁne itself to communicating exactly
what it is necessary to communicate.
CHANGE
What happens, though, if the expectations of the courts
change, whether as a result of changes of practice or law or
because of other factors beyond the control of the
legislature or the drafters? When is it sensible and when is
it constitutionally appropriate to allow changes of
expectations to affect the process of legislation? To what
extent is it possible for the courts to change legislative
drafting practice by changing expectations? And are such
changes, like other common law changes, to be regarded as
involving statements of what the law has always been and
therefore retrospective. Do they not place the drafter in
the dilemma I have just described, where more substantive
background law is in the process of development?
There are certainly some changes of expectation drafters
cannot ignore and those are the ones they themselves are
responsible for. As I have said, the drafter is not working
within a ﬁxed system. Change is what we have to do; and
too much caution about change may equally result in
ineffective legislation. Every piece of the drafter’s own
work has the potential to change the system itself, both the
system within which legislation is made and the system
within which it will be construed. And those changes at
least have the authority of the Queen in Parliament.
The period of 35 years of change, at which I wish to look,
is not chosen at random and contains changes that raise all
these questions. It is just over 35 years since I was called to
the Bar. The period covers my entire professional life — so
far. Furthermore, using 1973 as a starting place enables me
to include what everyone will accept was a major
transforming change to UK law, namely, the accession of
the UK to the European Communities and the
commencement of the European Communities Act 1972
(ECA). Finally, by choosing this period, I can use, as a
benchmark, two reviews of the state of legislative drafting
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in the UK that took place near the beginning of the period:
the Renton Committee report in 1975 on The Preparation of
Legislation (Cmnd 6053) and the 1977 book Legislative
Drafting: A New Approach (Butterworths) by the late Sir
William Dale, in whose honour this lecture series is
named.
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd the right order in which to discuss the
different changes that have occurred. The impact of each
has emerged gradually over time. So there is a considerable
area of uncertainty about the extent to which they have
operated together, or have impacted on each other.
Even the incorporation of EEC/EU law into UK law, which
can be precisely timed, did not have an immediate impact.
My own memories of joining the public service in 1975,
and the Ofﬁce of the Parliamentary Counsel in 1976, are
that initially the likely impact of EEC law was expected to
be of relatively limited signiﬁcance for the UK legislator.
EC laws were thought to concern a narrow range of
matters dealt with by UK law; and the constitutional
impact of section 2 of the ECA 1972 was not at ﬁrst fully
accepted in practice.
Drafters worried more about the risks of inadvertently
repealing the effect of section 2 by providing for something
inconsistent with European obligations, than about
producing something that was ineffective or obscure
because of an inconsistency with a European law with
superior authority. The position did not really begin to
become clear until 1981 and the case of Macarthys Ltd v
Smith 129/79 [1981] QB 180. Even then I would suggest
it took until Factortame in 1991 (R v Secretary of State for
Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 3): c-221/89 [1992] QB
680) fully to sink into UK legal consciousness. It is
interesting that the process of accepting a form of quasi-
entrenchment has been much quicker with the Human
Rights Act 1998, perhaps because of the previous EEC
experience.
A better starting place for a discussion of the impact on
legislative drafting of change over the past 35 years is the
analysis of legislative practice that appears in the Renton
and Dale reviews. In Chapter VI of the Renton report the
criticism was set out as follows:
“6.2 The complaints we have heard may be broadly
grouped as follows:
(a) Language. It is said that the language used is obscure
and complex, its meaning elusive and its effect
uncertain.
(b) Over-elaboration. It is said that the desire for “certainty”
in the application of legislation leads to over-
elaboration.
(c) Structure. The internal structure of, and sequence of
clauses within, individual statutes is considered to be
often illogical and unhelpful to the reader.
(d) Arrangement and amendment. The chronological
arrangement of the statutes and the lack of clear
connection between various Acts bearing on related
subjects are said to cause confusion and make it
difﬁcult to ascertain the current state of the law on any
given matter. This confusion is increased by the
practice of amending an existing Act, not by altering its
text (and reprinting it as a new Act) but by passing a
new Act which the reader has to apply to the existing
Act and work out the meaning for himself.”
Dale diagnosed the problem as unintelligibility resulting
from obscurity and excessive length. He said:
“Features making for obscurity or length, usually both,
in United Kingdom Acts are –
(a) long, involved sentences and sections;
(b) much detail, little principle;
(c) an indirect approach to the subject-matter;
(d) subtraction – as in “Subject to”, “Provided that”;
(e) centrifugence – a ﬂight from the centre to deﬁnition
and interpretation clauses (“the famous freak of
modern law givers”);
(f) poor arrangement;
(g) schedules – too many and too long;
(h) cross-reference to other Acts – saving space, but
increasing the vexation.”
Have there been changes in drafting practice that suggest a
response to those criticisms? Certainly, there are examples
of the same criticisms being repeated today. But is that
justiﬁed? The criticism of the statute book tends to come
from those who read Acts of many different dates, rather
than from those who conﬁne themselves to reading current
Bills. It takes time for a change to have an impact on the
whole corpus of statute law.
My observation is that there have been some very
considerable changes in the use of language and in the
structuring and detail of legislation and in the use of cross
references. I am not claiming that everything has always
moved in the same direction. But I do assert that a
comparison of today’s Acts with those of 30 years ago will
reveal a general simplifying trend and the modiﬁcation of
techniques with a view to enhancing both clarity and
readability. Has this been the result of the criticisms voiced
at the beginning of my period? Or have other factors been
inﬂuential?
As one of the few current members of the Ofﬁce who was
drafting in the 1970s, I doubt whether that consensus of
criticism in the Renton Report and Dale’s book was
entirely fair at the time. I believe that a comparison at that
time between Acts of Parliament and other legal
documents on the basis of the Renton and Dale criticisms
would have come down in favour of the Acts. Nevertheless,
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I think it would be fair to say that the consensus of the
criticism is one of the factors that has contributed to
change, as has the movement for the simpliﬁcation of the
drafting of other legal documents. On the other hand,
there are certainly other factors too that have contributed
to the attachment of even greater importance to
accessibility and readability.
We do need to recognise however that the case for
simplicity in legislation and plain language is not new. One
of my favourite provisions in this context is from the Act
for the establishment of the succession of the Crown of this
realm of 1536, which provides that the provisions of the
Act shall:
“be taken and accepted according to the plain words and
sentences therein contained, and shall not to be interpreted or
expounded by colour of any pretence or cause or by any subtle
arguments, inventions or reasons to the hindrance,
disturbance or derogation of this Act”
This, it has to be remembered, is the Act that declared the
marriage to the King of Anne Boleyn — attainted for
treason on account of her adultery — to be void ab initio.
Returning however to the last 35 years, an example of a
change of practice that was attributable both to outside
criticism and to other factors is the expansion of the use of
textual amendment as a technique for changing the law.
The move to textual amendment had already begun some
years before I joined the Ofﬁce of the Parliamentary
Counsel in 1976, but it was ratiﬁed and reinforced in
chapter 13 of the Renton report. Other factors, however,
were also inﬂuential.
The theory that each Act was an independent proposition
changing the law and so needing, so far as possible, to be
self-contained in order to satisfy the requirements of
Parliament had been questioned as a result of the extra
push for consolidations that followed the establishment of
the Law Commissions in the 1960s (see for example,
Chorley and Dworking, “The Law Commissions Acts,
1965” 28 MLR 675 at 681). At the same time too there
was a developing expectation that publishing techniques,
the Statutes in Force project (Statutes in Force: ofﬁcial
revised edition, London, HMSO, last edition 1996) and so
on, would facilitate the accessibility of “as amended” texts,
the previous absence of which had made textual
amendment sometimes unattractive. Then, since the 1970s
rapid technological advance has reinforced the availability
of “as amended” texts and so embedded textual
amendment further into UK drafting practice.
On the other hand, there has not been a shift to the system
often found in Antipodean jurisdictions, where large Acts
on particular topics are treated as conceptual loose leaf
binders into which all subsequent changes have to be ﬁtted.
In some areas there is a tendency in this direction in the
UK, but in others we are still very far from that approach.
Tax law and social security law have been re-enacted, each
in a series of Acts passed to cover the whole story, and most
changes are ﬁtted textually into the text of those Acts.
Education law, on the other hand, tends to accumulate in
many different successive Acts. I have no certain or clear
explanation for this.
One factor may well be the way the tension between
continuity and change manifests itself in English law, and
maybe also in the UK Parliament, in a reluctance to accept
the notion of a statutory code. This means that, in the UK
— perhaps more than elsewhere, legislation and the
process of legislating is seen as an interference with the
existing corpus of law, a set of running repairs on an
existing structure.
We are reluctant to start again, often perhaps because it
can be difﬁcult to get a very clear picture of how we got to
where we are. The fear of inadvertently demolishing a load-
bearing wall raises its head again and the claims of
continuity prevail over the desire to produce a clean re-
enactment. Furthermore the other demand of continuity:
the need to understand not only where we are, but also the
route we have taken to get there — is also an incentive to
draft in a way that tells a chronological story rather than
presents the reader with a series of tableaux in freeze-
frame.
I mentioned new technology and how it has reinforced the
practice of textual amendment. New technology has also
had a wider impact on the way legislation is written, as well
on the way it is interpreted. I have been heard to say that
when I entered Ofﬁce of the Parliamentary Counsel in
1976, new technology consisted of a plastic eraser and a
propelling pencil.
Today every drafter works with a keyboard and software
that takes much of the routine load off the individual. It is
no longer the task of the drafter, every time a Bill is
redrafted, manually to re-number all the clauses and
subsections that have been affected by insertions and
deletions and then manually to correct all the internal
cross-references. This can be, and is, done mechanically.
Verbal consistency no longer requires a complete read-
through. The search facility has transformed the task of
producing an internally consistent document.
It would be foolish to ignore the effect this change has had
both on the process of legislation and on the product.
More generally too, the impact on ideas of the practical
technicalities by which they can be recorded and
communicated is a fascinating subject.
My observation is that one major transformation produced
by new technology has been to reduce the risks of revision.
A 1970s drafter was probably much more reluctant to
undertake a radical revision of the text, because of a much
higher risk of inadvertently losing some important element.
Giving the drafter a computer on which the text can be
instantaneously reworked is a world away, or at least now
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almost a working lifetime away, from that in which a
shorthand typist had to be summoned to effect the change
with as many carbon copies as were needed, and where the
result had to await the drafter’s turn in the queue for
typing services.
There may be neophobes who will say that new technology
has undermined the disciplines that kept legislation
concise and clear. And there is a case to be made for that.
Some disciplines that operated to develop a habit of
accuracy and conciseness and were inculcated by the
mechanics of doing the job now have to be taught more
directly and consciously allocated a suitable priority.
However, I do not lament that. Partly that is because there
is no point in doing so. The changes were inevitable. But it
is also because the beneﬁts, in my view, outweigh the losses,
so long as the losses are identiﬁed and a proper assessment
made of what is needed to mitigate them. The world where
revision is less of a risk is the world where the drafter has
more opportunities to perfect the legislative text.
In some areas of the law computers may be thought to have
led to prolixity and a loss of original thought. I do not
believe that to be true of legislative drafting. The efﬁciency
produced by new technology has produced a much greater
facility for revising text. Even if the majority of the extra
time produced by the efﬁciency is used on other priorities,
some of it at least is now usable on producing greater
simplicity and readability. Today, we may have the risk —
created by the opportunity to make a last minute change
— of producing a last minute error. My view is that we
cannot regret that there was probably a higher risk of error
when old technology denied us the use of the last minute.
New technology has increased the efﬁciency of drafters,
both when drafting and when doing research. It has also
correspondingly changed the way legislation is read –
much is now read in chunks online – and it has also
increased the facilities for research by those who seek to
construe it. That, I believe, has been another signiﬁcant
aspect of the change over the last 35 years to the context in
which legislation is read. There is too some evidence for a
developing consequential change in the way it is being
written.
The decision in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 gives rise to
different emotions amongst those concerned with
legislation. For me though it represents a symptom of a
change of much wider impact and an important factor to
be considered when looking at the dynamism of the
relationship between the courts and legislators.
For as long as I have been in the law, a tension has been said
to exist between those who assert a preference for literal
interpretation and those who assert a more “purposive”
approach. However, that tension still seemed relatively
unreal when the rules about identifying the purpose
effectively conﬁned the material to which reference could
be made to the text of the Act.
The drafters’ reaction to Pepper v Hart was generally
phlegmatic. We were concerned that the decision created
research difﬁculties — difﬁculties that have now been
mitigated, but not removed, by new technology. Finding a
ministerial statement on a provision was difﬁcult.
Difﬁculties included the way clause numbers can change at
each Parliamentary stage, the way amendments are
grouped for debate, often in a rearranged order, and the
fact that what were then called standing committee
proceedings (where most detailed debates on legislation
took place) were published in limited editions that did not
make them easily accessible.
But when asked about the impact of the substance of the
decision on our work, we said that the words of the statute
were our only tool: so provided that we got the provisions
clear — so that, on a literal reading, they were
unambiguous and did what was required by our
instructions — then we had no need to worry.
The signiﬁcance of Pepper v Hart, though, as I now see it,
was that it was symptomatic of a more general trend, or
perhaps it was the catalyst for the acceleration of that
trend. The trend is for the courts and others increasingly to
look outside the text of the Act for its meaning. This is a
tendency that has been noticed and commented on by
others before me (I would like to express my gratitude to
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry for the help provided to me in
developing my ideas for this lecture by his address to the
Ofﬁce of the Parliamentary Counsel in May this year).
The use of explanatory notes for Bills in Parliament as a
way of providing clear explanations for Parliament of their
effects had been championed by the Ofﬁce of the
Parliamentary Counsel. The notes could set out in plain
language the whole context of a provision. And we
championed them at least partly because they provided a
vehicle to which we could, in the interests of continuity,
divert all the unnecessary material that we should
otherwise have been invited to include in the text.
Looking back, it is possible to question how successful that
strategy has been. The use of explanatory notes to protect
the purity of the legislative text is undermined if they
become too readily a tool for construing the Act (see Dr
Roderick Munday, “Explanatory notes and statutory
interpretation”, (2006) 170 Justice of the Peace 124-32);
and, as others have shown, there is an increasing tendency
to use them in that way.
In that context I detect some evidence that the increased
willingness of courts to look beyond the text may be
producing a relaxation – but not, I hasten to say, an
abandonment – of the rules drafters apply to themselves
about the inclusion of explanatory material in legislative
text. There is still a rigid adherence to a rule that
explanatory material must be clearly identiﬁable as such,
but I observe that such material is no longer rigorously
excised.
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The use of framework clauses and more signposts,
particularly in the work of the Tax Law Rewrite Project, is
indicative of the change. It represents a conscious change
of direction from that project, but it is also an approach
that has been carried into individual practice on other Bills.
The new parameters may not yet be clear. But the cautious
development of new boundaries provides a good
illustration of how a whole range of changes and inﬂuences
can result in a shift in the balance between continuity and
change in the practice of legislative drafting. The demands
of continuity remain. It is still dangerous to put
unnecessary material in statutes. But in many cases the risk
of doing so is being assessed in a slightly different way from
the way it was in the past.
So this aspect of a recognisable move away from a
fundamentally textual approach to a more teleological
approach may be affecting the way drafting is done.
Interestingly, the move in the courts coincides with a
similar change in the way legislative proposals are debated
in Parliament. There is less debate now on the literal effect
of the Bill. This change has been encouraged by
Parliamentary changes under which the programming (viz
time-tabling) of debate on a Bill in the Commons has
become the usual practice. Programming has spread the
debate on a Bill more evenly and encouraged a greater
concentration of debate on points of principle and
purpose, rather than textual analysis. Previously,
Parliamentary debates on a Bill would often include a
substantial period devoted to a relatively random sample of
points on the technical or textual detail.
The procedural changes have also meant that there is less
incentive for the drafter to produce the shortest possible
text in the smallest number of clauses. That increases
volume but it also contributes to readability and simplicity,
enabling provisions to be split and broken down into
shorter, clearer propositions, rather than rolled together to
save space.
I want to emphasise that in describing the procedural
changes I am making no criticism. The duty of Parliament
is to debate legislation in whatever way Parliament thinks
best serves those whom Parliament represents.
My observation, though, is that a concentration on purpose
and principles both in the courts and in Parliament means
that more and more extraneous material is being accessed
to ﬁnd out what the words we have drafted mean. I detect
too that, in practice, there is an increased willingness for
readers of Bills and of Acts to turn to extraneous material,
not only if the literal text fails to yield a certain meaning,
but rather to reinforce – before the text has been wholly
exhausted as a source of meaning – what was in fact only a
preliminary assessment of its intention.
This gradual but general loosening of the connection
between the legal meaning of a piece of legislation and the
detail of its text has been reinforced by other factors. One
of these I have already mentioned: the incorporation of EU
law into UK law. There can be no denying the impact of
EU law on the way UK law has developed over the past 35
years. Several different factors have contributed to that.
Sir William Dale in Legislative Drafting: A New Approach drew
attention to what he claimed to be a different approach to
legislation in continental jurisdictions: “The continental
law makers, inﬂuenced by their heritage of codes, think out
their laws in terms of principle, or at least of broad
intention, and express the principle or intention in their
legislation.”
The approach in EU legislation is certainly different from
that in a traditional UK statute, but I am not sure that this
distinction, founded on the supposed and traditional
distinction between continental rationalism and English
empiricism, sums it up. In my English, empirical way, I
would prefer to list factors that I think mean that EU
provisions differ in approach from the traditional UK
approach.
First, both the text and the policy of EU law is negotiated
in a way that UK statutes are not. A UK statute takes a
form which gives effect to the policy of the UK
Government. These days policy is seldom formulated
without extensive consultation, and Bills have to be
acceptable to Parliament; but the legislation ultimately
always gives effect to decisions by the executive that others
are invited to accept. A negotiated document is different,
because different views about its meaning may continue
after promulgation amongst all those who contributed to
its formulation.
Secondly, EU legislation is designed to ﬁt several
jurisdictions and is not tied to place in the same way as UK
legislation.
Thirdly, as Dale suggests, it is not tied to particular ways of
legal thinking. It is true that some continental systems
think from principles to rules, whereas the tradition of
English law has always been to infer rules and principles
from particular outcomes. This has an effect on the way it
is drafted; but it would be wrong too to suggest that EU
legislation has not also been inﬂuenced since 1973 by the
common law approach of the UK and the Republic of
Ireland.
Finally, EU legislation is drafted in, and to ﬁt, several
languages, and this involves an element of uncertainty
about its application.
The development of the principles of direct applicability, a
desire, in the interests of minimising unnecessary
regulation, not to gold plate the implementation of EU
obligations and indeed the decisions of the courts have all
led those implementing EU legislation in the UK to rely
more heavily on the technique of “copy out” – the
transliteration, rather than the translation of EU law into
UK law (see Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc
and another v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd [2006]
EWCA Civ 1094 per Lord Justice Jacob, para 22). The
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consequence is that provisions in EU form can very often
ﬁnd themselves as neighbours to more traditional UK
provisions. Inevitably the proximity has had an effect on
what seems possible in the UK provision and doubtless too
on the way it may be construed.
The extent to which EU law has inﬂuenced UK law is
unclear because many of the differences to which EU law
has introduced UK law have been mirrored in domestic
developments. So the growth of pre-legislative scrutiny and
consultation, and a corresponding expansion of the degree
of involvement in legislation by those outside Parliament,
has perhaps shifted the nature of legislation away from
something that was exclusively the expression of will of the
government towards something to meet the needs of
different groups.
If it is still the case that the text of a UK statute is not a
negotiated text, it is nevertheless the case that the policy it
implements is more often negotiated. Certainly, there are
today many more mechanisms for ensuring that policy
involves a careful balance between the competing legislative
ambitions of all those interested, including the executive.
Legislative and administrative devolution too has
introduced more diversity of place and jurisdiction, and in
Wales bilingualism, into UK law, with now three separate
drafting ofﬁces, in addition to the Ofﬁce of the
Parliamentary Counsel in London, developing their own at
least slightly different approaches properly attuned to local
judicial, political and legislative conventions. It is clear that
this diversity itself, coupled with the complexity of
transition from jurisdiction to jurisdiction within the UK,
places additional tensions on the ability to maintain a single
and clearly identiﬁable textual approach — tensions, I
should say, that all the drafting ofﬁces are working closely
together to mitigate.
The need for legislation in all UK jurisdictions, including
by convention in the UK Parliament, to respect the
parameters of the different devolution settlements has also
necessarily involved a more principle based-approach to
legislation. The “pith and substance” test (see eg s 29(3) of
the Scotland Act 1998 or s 94(7) of the Government of
Wales Ac 2006) and the other similarly broadly framed
tests of whether something is within devolved competence
have thus become very powerful inﬂuences on the whole
nature of UK legislation.
Yet another change that has had a signiﬁcant effect over the
past 35 years has been an acceleration in the development
of administrative law and the principles of judicial review
over that period. The start of the process had begun some
years before the beginning of my period, but the extent to
which the courts now consider it necessary and
appropriate to question and review administrative
decisions has expanded enormously over the past 35 years.
The development of the remedy and concept of judicial
review, something that did not exist at all at the beginning
of the period — although the prerogative writs did — may
well have contributed to this, coinciding as it does with a
changing relationship in a dynamic unwritten constitution,
between the Executive and the courts.
The professionalisation of both the law and politics and
related social changes have reinforced this so that the
interpretation of statutes is now more of an arm’s length
affair. The establishment of the Supreme Court will remove
the most senior judges from Parliament completely, and
the proportion of members of the judiciary with
experience as Parliamentarians is probably as low today as
it has ever been.
These changes are associated too with the increased
importance that is attached to a developing constitutional
principle in favour of a genuine separation of powers. This
is attributable to European/ ECHR inﬂuences as well as to
the constitutional analysis required by the process of
devolution. In the context of a developing doctrine of
qualiﬁed entrenchment for certain UK statutes, I was
struck too, recently, to hear a judge of the Irish Supreme
Court explain that it is the separation of powers that does
the job for the Irish Constitution that is achieved in the UK
by the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament.
The Human Rights Act 1998 ﬁts squarely within this line
of development that in different ways seeks to deﬁne the
proper constitutional role of the courts. By introducing
international obligations into domestic law, that Act has
introduced — and made more acceptable — the legal
reasoning that proceeds from principles to rules, rather
than vice versa and so invites the courts to intervene, on
the basis of principle, in the administrative decisions made
by the Executive under detailed statutory powers.
If these factors have exempliﬁed a move from detail and
literalism to principle and purpose, one complaint that the
drafter has always had to meet, and has to meet still, is the
complaint of increasing volume. I have said something
about this already in the context of the discussion of new
technology and of the extent to which the pace of change
may have shifted the balance in favour of shorter term
priorities. But if volume is a fault, the changes I mention
here are all contributory causes to a steady growth in
volume.
• the increasing use of extraneous material
• the effect on the form of legislation of wider
consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny
• the demands of EU and ECHR compatibility
• the demands and effects of devolution
• the development and growth of administrative law
• the distance between courts and Parliament and the
increasing inﬂuence of a doctrine of a separation of
powers
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• the factors which require an approach to law that
requires the identiﬁcation of principles in speciﬁc rules
and the subordination of rules to the principles.
All of these have evinced a response from the drafter that
requires more words. The possibility that increased volume
is one of the responses to these factors leads me on to the
Tax Law Rewrite Project as a ﬁnal factor that has effected a
change in drafting practice. The Project was established in
the late 1990s mainly in response to criticism of the
increasing volume and apparent complexity of tax
legislation. It is now expecting to complete its work on
rewriting both income tax and corporation tax law in
2010. In the process it has made a signiﬁcant contribution
to the way legislation is drafted. Members of the Ofﬁce of
the Parliamentary Counsel have circulated through the
project regularly over the past 10-12 years and, in the
process, have picked up new techniques in the production
of clearer and better organised statutes.
The work of the project has exposed a generation of
drafters to new techniques. In the event, the development
of these techniques have established that actually
conciseness, sometimes, has to be sacriﬁced to clarity to
cure the problem created by otherwise unavoidable
volume. It has been a project where the default position
was for innovation and simpliﬁcation, rather than
constancy to traditional techniques. It has been inﬂuential
on main-stream drafting. Its experience was of
considerable assistance to us in our recent switch to gender
neutral drafting.
CONCLUSIONS
My conclusions are these. I have shown that the demands
of continuity have to be respected by legislative drafters in
order to protect the system within which they operate and
to guarantee effectiveness. However, the system itself is
constantly changing and that involves, and indeed often
requires, a willingness to adapt legislative drafting
practices.
The changes affecting the system may result from express
demands for change. But there are other factors at play and
they are generally more signiﬁcant. The different factors
operate on each other; and what is cause and what is effect
are hard to pin down. The factors include legislation
modifying constitutional arrangements but even small
changes of practice have a potential effect. Other factors
include social changes, political developments, changes to
the procedure and priorities of Parliament and
Parliamentarians and even technological change.
Parliamentary Counsel need to respond to these factors
cautiously because of the demands of continuity and the
risk of themselves producing unintended change; but the
same demands mean that they do have to respond to
change around them and to do so sensitively and, if the
forces for change are strong, collectively. Remaining
constant to an outdated view of the context in which they
are operating can result in ineffective legislation.
Continuity demands the drafter to maintain a delicate
balance in the midst of change. To return to Heraclitus on
change “No man steps in the same river twice. He is not
the same man nor is it the same river.” Each Bill requires a
new assessment of the balance. But the drafter’s guide has
to be a common understanding, with other drafters, of the
current state of the competing demands of both continuity
and the forces of change.
On the practical level, the Tax Law Rewrite Project
provides a good illustration of a response by drafters to the
need to preserve continuity and to meet an imperative for
change. It shows how drafters can respond collectively to
secure continuity in the drafting of legislation, while
allowing an innovative development of new techniques.
The lesson is to ﬁnd the common approach that best
accommodates the forces of change – in that case the
demand for more clarity and the need, as things turned
out, to mitigate the consequences of increased volume,
otherwise than by making things more compact.
I have identiﬁed a number of forces for change and have
identiﬁed responses to those forces. Recent forces for
change all have a common feature involving the
attachment of increased relevance to factors that distract
from the literal effect of the text. The appropriate
response to change of that sort seems to me to be a
collective acceptance by drafters of an even greater
responsibility to ensure that the text of the legislation
yields a clear answer.
So the responsibility of the drafter, when giving effect to
the wishes of those instructing, becomes a responsibility
to provide legislation that yields its meaning clearly and
immediately in a way that cannot be falsiﬁed by anything
(including external material or indeed extraneous
analysis). But the text remains our only tool. Plus ça
change.... The task is what it has always been: get the text
right and make it the ﬁnal answer. Maybe though, today’s
changed and changing context make that job just a bit
more difﬁcult.
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